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Abstract
In the traditional index coding problem, a server employs coding to send messages to n clients
within the same broadcast domain. Each client already has some messages as side information and
requests a particular unknown message from the server. All clients learn the coding matrix so that
they can decode and retrieve their requested data. Our starting observation is that, learning the coding
matrix can pose privacy concerns: it may enable a client to infer information about the requests and
side information of other clients. In this paper, we mitigate this privacy concern by allowing each client
to have limited access to the coding matrix. In particular, we design coding matrices so that each client
needs only to learn some of (and not all) the rows to decode her requested message. By means of two
different privacy metrics, we first show that this approach indeed increases the level of privacy. Based
on this, we propose the use of k-limited-access schemes: given an index coding scheme that employs T
transmissions, we create a k-limited-access scheme with Tk ≥ T transmissions, and with the property
that each client needs at most k transmissions to decode her message. We derive upper and lower bounds
on Tk for all values of k, and develop deterministic designs for these schemes, which are universal, i.e.,
independent of the coding matrix. We show that our schemes are order-optimal when either k or n is
large. Moreover, we propose heuristics that complement the universal schemes for the case when both
n and k are small.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized that broadcasting can offer significant bandwidth savings compared
to point-to-point communication [1], [2], and could be leveraged in several wireless network
applications. Use cases include Wi-Fi (cellular) networks where an access point (a base station)
is connected to a set of Wi-Fi (cellular) devices through a wireless broadcast channel, and where
devices request messages, such as YouTube videos. Another use case has recently emerged in the
context of distributed computing [3], [4], where worker nodes exchange data among themselves
to complete computational tasks.
A canonical setup which captures the essence of broadcast channels is the index coding
framework [5]. In an index coding instance, a server is connected to a set of clients through
a noiseless broadcast channel. The server has a database that contains a set of messages. Each
client: 1) possesses a subset of the messages that she already knows, which is referred to as
the side information set, and 2) requests a message from the database which is not in her side
information set. The server has full knowledge of the requests and side information sets of all
clients. A linear index code (or index code in short)1 is a linear coding scheme that comprises a
set of coded broadcast transmissions which allow each client to decode her requested message
using her side information set. The goal is to find an index code which uses the smallest possible
number of broadcast transmissions. The key ingredient in designing efficient (i.e., with a small
number of transmissions) index codes is the use of coding across messages.
The starting observation of this work is that, using coding over broadcast channels can cause
privacy risks. In particular, a curious client may infer information about the requests and side
information sets of other clients, which can be deemed sensitive by their owners. For example,
consider a set of clients that use a server to download YouTube videos. Although YouTube videos
are publicly available, a client requesting a video about a medical condition may not wish for
others to learn her request, or learn what are other videos that she has already downloaded.
To illustrate why coding can create privacy leakage, consider the index coding instance shown
in Figure 1. A server possesses a set of 5 messages, which we refer to as b1 to b5. The server is
1In this work, we solely focus on linear index codes.
3Server
Figure 1. An index coding example with 5 messages and 4 clients. Each client wants one message and has another as shown
above. The optimal index code consists of sending the two transmissions b1 + b2 and b3 + b4.
connected to a set of 4 clients: client 1 wants message b1 and has as side information message
b2; client 2 wants b2 and has b1; client 3 wants b3 and has b4; and client 4 wants b4 and has b3.
In this case, an optimal (i.e., with the minimum number of transmissions) index code consists of
sending 2 transmissions, namely b1+b2 and b3+b4: it is easy to see that each client can decode
the requested message from one of these transmissions using the side information. However, this
index code can allow curious clients to violate the privacy of other clients who share the broadcast
channel, by learning information that pertains to their requests and/or side information sets. For
example, assume that client 4 is curious. Upon learning the two transmissions, client 4 knows
that nobody is requesting message b5. Moreover, she knows that if a client is requesting b1 or
b2 (similarly, b3 or b4), then this client should have the other message as side information in
order to decode the requested message.
The solution that we propose to limit this privacy leakage stems from the following observa-
tion: it may not be necessary to provide clients with the entire set of broadcast transmissions.
Instead, each client can be given access, and learn the coding operations, for only a subset of
the transmissions, i.e., the subset that would allow her to decode the message that she requested.
Consider again the example in Figure 1. The optimal index code consists of two transmissions.
However, each client is able to decode her request using exactly one of the two transmissions.
Therefore, if each client only learns the coding coefficients for the transmission that she needs,
4then she will have no knowledge of the content of the other transmission, and thus would have
less information about the requests of the other clients. Limiting the access of each client to just
one out of the two transmissions was possible for this particular example; however, it is not the
case that every index code has this property.
Our approach in this paper builds on the idea described above. In particular, given an index
coding instance that uses T transmissions, we ask: Can we limit the access of each client to at
most k ≤ T transmissions, while still allowing each client to decode her requested message?
In other words, for a given index coding instance, what is the best (in terms of number of
transmissions) index code that we can design such that each client is able to decode her request
using at most k out of these transmissions? Our work attempts to understand the fundamental
relation between limiting the accessibility of clients to the coding matrix and the attained level
of privacy. In particular, we propose the use of k-limited-access schemes, that transform the
coding matrix so as to restrict each client to access at most k rows of the transformed matrix,
as opposed to the whole of it. Our contributions include:
• We formalize the intuition that using k-limited-access-schemes can indeed increase the
attained level of privacy against curious clients. We demonstrate this using two privacy
metrics, namely an entropy-based metric and the maximal information leakage. In both
cases, we show that the attained level of privacy is linearly dependent on the value of k,
i.e., privacy increases linearly with the number of rows of the coding matrix that we hide.
• We design polynomial time (in the number of clients) universal k-limited-access schemes
(i.e., that do not depend on the structure of the coding matrix), and require a simple matrix
multiplication. We prove that these schemes are order-optimal in some regimes, in particular
when either k or n (the number of clients) is large. Interestingly, when k is larger than a
threshold, these schemes enable to restrict the amount of access to half of the coding
matrix with an overhead of exactly one additional transmission. This result indicates that
some privacy-bandwidth trade-off points can be achieved with minimal overhead.
• We propose algorithms that depend on the structure of the coding matrix and show that,
when n and k are both small, they provide improved performance with respect to the
universal schemes mentioned above. These schemes use a graph-theory representation of
5the problem, and are optimal for some special instances.
• We provide analytical and numerical performance evaluations of our schemes. We show
how our proposed k-limited-access schemes provide a bandwidth-privacy trade-off, namely
how much bandwidth usage (i.e., number of transmissions) is needed to achieve a certain
level of privacy (captured by the value of k). We show that our proposed schemes provide
a trade-off curve that is close to the lower bound when either k or n is large. In the case
where both n and k are small, we show through numerical evaluations that our proposed
algorithms give an average performance that is close to the lower bound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our notation, formulates the problem,
and gives a geometric interpretation. Section III discusses how k-limited-access schemes limit
the privacy leakage. Section IV shows the construction of k-limited-access schemes and proves
their order-optimality when either n or k is large. Section V designs algorithms which are better-
suited for cases when both n and k are small. Section VI discusses related work and Section VII
concludes the paper. Some of the proofs are delegated to the appendices.
II. NOTATION, PROBLEM FORMULATION AND GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATION
Notation. Calligraphic letters indicate sets; |X | is the cardinality of X ; [n] is the set of integers
{1, · · · , n}; boldface lower case letters denote vectors and boldface upper case letters indicate
matrices; given a vector b, bi indicates the i-th element of b; given matrices A and B, B ⊂k A
indicates that B is formed by a set of k rows of A; 0j is the all-zero row vector of dimension
j; 1j denotes a row vector of dimension j of all ones and Ij is the identity matrix of dimension
j; eji is the all-zero row vector of length j with a 1 in position i; for all x ∈ R, the floor and
ceiling functions are denoted with bxc and dxe, respectively; logarithms are in base 2; Pr(X)
refers to the probability of event X .
Index Coding. We consider an index coding instance, where a server has a database B of m
messages B = {bM}, whereM = [m] is the set of message indices, and bj ∈ FF2 , j ∈M, with
F being the message size, and where operations are done over the binary field. The server is
connected through a broadcast channel to a set of clients C = {cN}, where N = [n] is the set
of client indices. We assume that m ≥ n. Each client ci, i ∈ N , has a subset of the messages
6{bSi}, with Si ⊂ M, as side information and requests a new message bqi with qi ∈ M \ Si
that she does not have. We assume that the server employs a linear code, i.e., it designs a set
of broadcast transmissions that are linear combinations of the messages in B. The linear index
code can be represented as AB = Y, where A ∈ FT×m2 is the coding matrix, B ∈ Fm×F2 is the
matrix of all the messages and Y ∈ FT×F2 is the resulting matrix of linear combinations. Upon
receiving Y, client ci, i ∈ N , employs linear decoding to decode the requested message bqi .
Problem Formulation. In [5], it was shown that the index coding problem is equivalent to the
rank minimization of an n×m matrix G ∈ Fn×m2 , whose i-th row gi, i ∈ [n], has the following
properties: (i) has a 1 in the position qi (i.e., the index of the message requested by client ci),
(ii) has a 0 in the j-th position for all j ∈M\Si, (iii) can have either 0 or 1 in all the remaining
positions. For instance, with reference to the example in Figure 1, we would have
G =

1 ? 0 0 0
? 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 ? 0
0 0 ? 1 0

,
where ? can be either 0 or 1. It was shown in [5] that finding an optimal linear coding scheme
i.e., with minimum number of transmissions) is equivalent to completing G (i.e., assign values
to the ? components of G) so that it has the minimum possible rank. Once we have completed
G, we can use a basis of the row space of G (of size T = rank (G)) as a coding matrix A. In
this case, client ci can construct gi as a linear combination of the rows of A, i.e., ci performs
the decoding operation diAB = diY, where di ∈ FT2 is the decoding row vector of ci chosen
such that diA = gi. Finally, client ci can successfully decode bqi by subtracting from diY the
messages corresponding to the non-zero entries of gi (other than the requested message). We
remark that any linear index code that satisfies all clients with T transmissions (where T is
not necessarily optimal) – and can be obtained by any index code design algorithm [6]–[8] –
corresponds to a completion of G (i.e., given A ∈ FT×m2 , we can create a corresponding G in
polynomial time).
In our problem formulation we assume that we start with a given matrix G of rank T , i.e.,
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Figure 2. A comparison between the conventional and the proposed transmission protocols. The proposed transmission protocol
incurs a negligible increase in the transmission overhead when both n and m are o(F ).
we are given n distinct vectors that belong to a T -dimensional subspace. Using a basis of the
row space of the given G, we construct A ∈ FT×m2 . Then, we ask: Given n distinct vectors gi,
i ∈ [n], in a T -dimensional space, can we find a minimum-size set Ak with Tk ≥ T vectors,
such that each gi can be expressed as a linear combination of at most k vectors in Ak (with
1 ≤ k ≤ T )? The vectors in Ak form the rows of the coding matrix Ak that we will employ.
Then by definition, client ci will be able to reconstruct gi using the matrix A
(i)
k ⊂k Ak. We can
equivalently restate the question as follows: Given a coding matrix A, can we find P ∈ FTk×T2 ,
with Tk as small as possible, such that Ak = PA and each row of G can be reconstructed by
combining at most k rows of Ak? Note that k = T corresponds to the conventional transmission
scheme of an index coding problem for which P = IT . In the remainder of the paper we will
refer to a scheme that chooses Ak to be the coding matrix as k-limited-access scheme.
Transmission Protocol. In order to realize the privacy benefits of using k-limited-access schemes
– which we will thoroughly illustrate in Section III – we propose a different transmission protocol
for the index coding setup. Figure 2 shows both the conventional and the proposed transmission
protocols. In the conventional protocol, the server designs a set of T packets, each corresponding
to an equation from the set of equations AB = Y. As shown in Figure 2(a), packet i ∈ [T ]
consists of (i) a payload which contains the linear combination yi and (ii) a header which
contains the coefficients ai used to create the equation. In the conventional protocol, the server
sends these packets (both headers and payloads) on the broadcast channel to all clients. Our
8Figure 3. A geometric interpretation of k-limited-access schemes. An index code A is obtained from a particular filling of the
matrix G. Therefore, the collection of row vectors of G lies in the span of A. Finding Ak is equivalent to finding a collection
of subspaces, each of dimension at most k, to cover G. Client ci is sent a collection of (at most) k rows of Ak; these correspond
to one subspace which covers gi.
proposed protocol, however, operates differently. Specifically, the server generates packets which
correspond to the set of equations AkB = Yk in a way that is similar to the conventional
protocol. The server then sends only the payloads of these packets on the broadcast channel.
Differently, the server sends the coefficients corresponding to only A(i)k ⊂k Ak to client ci using
a private key or on a dedicated private channel (e.g., the same channel used by ci to convey
her request to the server). Thus, using a k-limited-access scheme incurs an extra transmission
overhead to privately convey the coding vectors. In particular, the total number of transmitted
bits Ck can be upper bounded as Ck ≤ nkm + TkF, while the total number of transmitted bits
C using a conventional scheme is C = T (F + m). The extra overhead incurred is negligible
in comparison to the broadcast transmissions that convey the encoded messages when n and m
are both o(F ), which is a reasonable assumption for large file sizes (for instance, when sharing
YouTube videos).
Geometric Interpretation. The geometric interpretation of our problem is depicted in Figure 3.
An index code A corresponds to a particular completion of the matrix G. Therefore, the set of
row vectors in G lies in the row span of A (which is of dimension T ). We denote this subspace
of dimension T by L. The problem of finding a matrix Ak can be interpreted as finding a set
of subspaces, each of dimension at most k, such that each row vector gi, i ∈ [n], is covered
9by at least one of these smaller subspaces. Once these subspaces are selected, then the rows of
Ak are taken as the union of the basis vectors of all these subspaces. Client ci is then given
the basis vectors of subspace Li, i.e., the one which covers gi, instead of the whole matrix Ak.
Therefore ci would have perfect knowledge of Li instead of L. Having less information about L
naturally translates to less information about the requests of other clients, as we more formally
discuss in the next section.
III. ACHIEVED PRIVACY LEVELS
In this section, we investigate and quantify the level of privacy that k-limited-access schemes
can achieve compared to a conventional index coding scheme (i.e., when each client has access
to the entire coding matrix). In what follows, we consider the setup described in the previous
section and suppose that client cn is curious, i.e., by leveraging the (at most) k rows A
(n)
k that
she receives, she seeks to infer information about client ci, i ∈ [n − 1]. Specifically, we are
interested in quantifying the amount of information that cn can obtain about qi (i.e., the identity
of the request of ci) as a function of k.
We assume that the index coding instance is random, i.e., we consider the requests and side
information sets of clients as random variables and denote them as Q[n] and S[n], respectively.
The operation of the server is shown in Figure 4 and is described as follows:
Step-1: The server obtains the information about the requests Q[n] and side information sets S[n]
of all clients c[n].
Step-2: Based on this information, the server designs an index code A by means of some index
coding algorithm [6]–[8].
Step-3: The server then applies the k-limited-access scheme to obtain Ak = PA, where P is a
deterministic mapping from A to Ak (see Section IV for the construction of P). This implies
that Tk is a deterministic function of T and k (i.e., the parameter of the scheme).
Step-4: The server sends A(i)k to client ci. If multiple A
(i)
k can be selected, then the server picks
and transmits one such matrix uniformly at random, independently of the underlying A which
might have generated this Ak.
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Figure 4. The procedure of designing an index code and applying k-limited-access schemes.
We are now interested in quantifying the level of privacy that is achieved by the protocol
described above. Towards this end, we use two privacy metrics, namely an entropy-based metric
and the maximal information leakage.
A. Entropy-Based Privacy Metric
The entropy-based privacy metric is inspired by the geometric interpretation of our problem
in Figure 3. We let L (respectively, Ln) be the random variable associated with the subspace
spanned by the T rows of the coding matrix A (respectively, spanned by the k row vectors of
A
(n)
k ). Client cn receives the matrix Yk and as such she knows Tk. Given this, we now define
the entropy-based privacy metric and evaluate it for the proposed protocol.
Definition III.1. The entropy-based privacy metric is defined as
P
(Ent)
k = H (L|Ln, Tk) ,
and quantifies the amount of uncertainty that cn has about the subspace spanned by the T rows
of the index coding matrix A.
Before characterizing P (Ent)k , we state the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma III.1. Given a subspace Ln ⊆ Fm2 of dimension k, let L(T, Ln) be the set of subspaces
L ⊆ Fm2 of dimension T ≥ k where Ln ⊆ L. Then |L(T, Ln)| is equal to
|L(T, Ln)| =
T−k−1∏
`=0
2m − 2k+`
2T − 2k+` .
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Assume an index coding setting with cn observing a particular subspace Ln = `n and a
number of transmissions Tk = tk for the k-limited access scheme. Moreover, we consider a
stronger adversary (i.e., curious client) and assume that she also knows the specific realization
of T = t. Given this, we can compute
P
(Ent)
k = H (L|Ln = `n, Tk = tk, T = t)
(a)
= H (L|Ln = `n, T = t) (b)= log (|L(t, `n)|)
(c)
= log
(
t−k−1∏
`=0
2m − 2k+`
2t − 2k+`
)
mt≈ m(t− k), (1)
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows because Tk is a deterministic function of T and k, which
is the parameter of the scheme (see Step-3); (ii) the equality in (b) follows by assuming that the
underlying system maintains a uniform distribution across all feasible t-dimensional subspaces
of Fm2 ; (iii) the equality in (c) follows by virtue of Lemma III.1. We note that when m  t,
then the quantity in (1) decreases linearly with k, i.e., as intuitively expected, the less rows of
the coding matrix cn learns, the less she can infer about the subspace spanned by the T rows of
the coding matrix A. This suggests that, by increasing k, cn has less uncertainty about qi. Note
also that P (Ent)k is zero when k = t; this is because, under this condition, cn receives the entire
index coding matrix, i.e., Ln = L, and hence she is able to perfectly reconstruct the subspace
spanned by its rows. However, although P (Ent)k = 0 when k = t, cn might still have uncertainty
about qi [9]. Quantifying this uncertainty is an interesting open problem; this uncertainty, in
fact, depends on the underlying system, e.g., on the index code used by the server and on the
distribution with which the index code matrix is selected.
B. Maximal Information Leakage
The second metric that we consider as our privacy metric is the Maximal Information Leakage
(MIL) [10]. Given two discrete random variables X and Y with alphabets X and Y , the MIL
from X to Y is denoted by L(X → Y ) and defined as
L(X → Y ) = sup
S−X−Y
log
∑
y∈Y maxs∈S pSY (s, y)
maxs∈S pS(s)
= log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X :pX(x)>0
pY |X(y|x), (2)
12
where the second equality is shown in [10]. The MIL metric captures the amount of information
leaked about X through Y to an adversary, who is interested in estimating a (possibly proba-
bilistic) function S of X . This is captured by the fact that S − X − Y forms a Markov chain
as shown in the expression in (2). The metric considers a worst-case such adversary, that is,
an adversary who is interested in computing a function S for which the maximum information
can be leaked out of Y . The result in [10] shows that this quantity depends only on the joint
distribution of X and Y . The following properties of the MIL are useful [10]:
• (Property 1): If X − Y − Z, then L(X → Z) ≤ min{L(X → Y ),L(Y → Z)},
• (Property 2): L(X → Y ) ≤ min{log |X |, log |Y|},
• (Property 3): L(X → X) = log | {x : pX(x) > 0} |.
To describe how we use the MIL as a privacy metric in our setup, we first need to define what
are the corresponding random variables X and Y , and then argue that the estimation of client
cn of the requests of other clients forms a Markov chain as required by the MIL definition. To
do so, we first define the following sets:
1) Given gi, Ak and an integer r, let P(gi,Ak, r) be the set of all possible sub-matrices A(i)k
of Ak with exactly r rows, that client ci can use to reconstruct the vector gi:
P(gi,Ak, r) = {Z ⊂r Ak | ∃d ∈ Fr2 s.t. gi = dZ} ,
2) Given qi, Si and Ak, let T (qi,Si,Ak) be the set of all possible sub-matrices A(i)k of Ak
with the minimum possible number of rows, such that client ci with side information Si can
decode qi:
T (qi,Si,Ak) =
⋃
gi∈G(qi,Si)
P(gi,Ak, rmin),
where
G(qi,Si) =
{
g ∈ Fm2 | gqi = 1, g[m]\{qi∪Si} = 0
}
,
and
rmin = minR, R =
{
r ∈ N+ : ∃gi ∈ G(qi,Si) such that P(gi,Ak, r) 6= ∅
}
.
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Since the requests and the side information sets are considered as random variables, then all
subsequently generated codes, namely A, Ak and A
(i)
k can be treated as random variables as well.
We denote the corresponding random variables of these quantities as A, Ak and A
(i)
k respectively.
In other words, for a given realization of Q[n] = q[n] and S[n] = S[n], the corresponding
realizations of the aforementioned codes used by the server are A = A, Ak = Ak and A
(i)
k = A
(i)
k .
When using conventional index codes (i.e., without k-limited-access schemes), client cn (i.e.,
the curious client and hence the adversary) would try to infer information about Q[n−1] from
observing A and given her information of Qn, Sn. Therefore, one can think of client cn estimate
of Q[n−1] as being a particular estimation function, the input of which is A. Differently, after
using k-limited-access schemes, client cn would only have observed A
(n)
k instead of A. Therefore,
in the context of MIL, one choice of the variables X and Y is A and A(n)k respectively. The
function S would therefore be client cn’s estimate of Q[n−1] out of A. The following proposition
shows that this choice of variables X , Y and S allows us to use the MIL as a metric.
Proposition III.2. The following Markov chain holds
Q[n−1] − A− Ak − A(n)k , (3)
conditioned on the knowledge of Qn, Sn in every stage of the chain.
Proof: We have the following:
• Q[n−1] − A − Ak holds since Ak is a deterministic function of A (see also Step-3 of the
proposed protocol);
• A − Ak − A(n)k holds since p(A(n)k |Ak, Qn, Sn) = 1/|T (Qn, Sn, Ak)|, independent of A, as
described in Step-4 of the proposed protocol.

We define P (MIL)k = L
(
A→ A(n)k |Qn = qn, Sn = Sn
)
as our MIL privacy metric2. The quantity
P
(MIL)
k gives the maximum amount of information that cn can extract about Q[n−1] given the
2We use the notation L (X → Y |Z) to denote that the variables X and Y are conditioned on Z.
14
Figure 5. This figure shows how the MIL privacy metrics compare for the conventional index coding schemes and the k-limited-
access schemes. Taking k = o(T ) would guarantee privacy gains when using k-limited-access schemes.
knowledge of Qn, Sn. The following theorem – proved in Appendix B – provides a guarantee
on P (MIL)k .
Theorem III.3. Using the MIL, the attained level of privacy against a curious client when
k-limited-access schemes are used is
P
(MIL)
k = O(|Sn|+mk). (4)
The quantity in (4) characterizes the maximum amount of information that can be leaked to
a curious client when k-limited-access schemes are used. It is clear that decreasing k would
decrease this amount of information; this aligns with the intuition that the less rows a server
gives to a client, the less information a client would be able to infer about other clients sharing
the broadcast domain. In order to shed more light on the benefits of using k-limited-access
schemes, one could compare the quantity P (MIL)k with the MIL obtained when k-limited-access
schemes are not used, i.e., when a client observes the whole matrix A. Let this quantity be
denoted as P¯ (MIL)k = L(A → A|Qn = qn, Sn = Sn). Then we have the following result, which
is proved in Appendix C.
Theorem III.4. Using the MIL, the attained level of privacy against a curious client for a
conventional index coding setup is
P¯
(MIL)
k = Ω
(
mT − T 2) . (5)
The results in Theorem III.3 and Theorem III.4 can be interpreted with the help of Figure 5.
The k-limited-access schemes achieve privacy gains as compared to conventional index codes,
when the two bounds in (4) and (5) strictly mismatch. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition
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for this is to select k = o(T ).
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF k-LIMITED-ACCESS SCHEMES
In this section, we focus on designing k-limited-access schemes and assessing their theo-
retical performance in terms of number of additional transmissions required with respect to a
conventional index coding scheme. Recall that we are given a coding matrix A that requires T
transmissions. Then, we seek to construct a matrix P ∈ FTk×T2 , so that Ak = PA, and each
client needs to access at most k rows of Ak to decode her requested message. In particular, we
aim at constructing matrices P with Tk as small as possible. Trivially, Tk ≥ T . Towards this
end, we first derive upper and lower bounds on Tk. Our main result is stated in the theorem
below.
Theorem IV.1. Given an index coding matrix A ∈ FT×m2 with T ≥ 2, it is possible to transform
it into Ak = PA with P ∈ FTk×T2 , such that each client can decode her requested message by
combining at most k rows of Ak, if and only if
Tk ≥ max {T, T ?} , T ? = min
{
Tk :
k∑
i=1
(
Tk
i
)
≥ n
}
. (6)
Moreover, we provide polynomial time (in n) constructions of P such that:
• When dT/2e ≤ k < T , then
Tk ≤ min {n, T + 1} ; (7)
• When 1 ≤ k < dT/2e, then
Tk ≤ min
{
n, k2dTk e
}
. (8)
Proof: The lower bound on Tk in (6) is proved in Appendix D. In particular, the bound in (6)
says that, if we are allowed to combine at most k out of the Tk vectors, then we should be able
to create a sufficient number of vectors. The two upper bounds on Tk in (7) and (8) are proved
in Section IV-A, where we give explicit constructions for P. 
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We note that, as expected, the smaller the value of k that we require, the larger the value of
Tk that we need to use. Trivially, for k = 1 we would need Tk = n, i.e., the server would need
to send uncoded transmissions. Thus, there is a trade-off between the bandwidth – measured as
the number Tk of broadcast transmissions – and privacy – captured by the value of k that we
require. Interestingly, when k ≥ dT/2e, with just one extra transmission, i.e., Tk = T + 1, we
can restrict the access of each client to at most half of the coding matrix, independently of the
coding matrix A. In other words, for this regime, we can achieve a certain level of privacy with
minimal overhead. However, as we further reduce the value of k, the overhead becomes more
significant. Moreover, the results in Theorem IV.1 also imply that our constructions are order-
optimal in the case of large values of n (when n = Θ(2T ))3. In addition, when dT/2e ≤ k < T ,
our scheme is at most one transmission away from the optimal number of transmissions, and this
is for any value of n. This is shown in the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix D.
Lemma IV.2. Consider an index coding setup. We have
• When n = 2T −1 and dT/2e ≤ k < T , the bounds in (6) and (7) coincide, i.e., the provided
construction of P is optimal;
• For any value of n < 2T − 1 and dT/2e ≤ k < T , the bound in (7) is at most one
transmission away from the bound in (6);
• When n = Θ(2T ) and for any value of k, then Tk = Θ(k2
T
k ), i.e., the provided construction
is order-optimal.
Figure 6 shows the trade-off exhibited by our proposed k-limited-access schemes between
bandwidth usage (Tk) and the attained privacy (k) - we use k as a proxy to the amount of
attained privacy against a curious client (see Section III). The figure shows the performance of
our constructions in Theorem IV.1 (labeled as Scheme-1), as well as the lower bound in (6)
(labeled as LB) and an upper bound which corresponds to uncoded transmissions (labeled as
UB). Figure 6(a) confirms the order-optimality of our constructions when n = 2T−1. In addition,
3Note that n is always O(2T ) (i.e., the number of distinct vectors gi for a given T is at most 2T − 1). The case of large
values of n corresponds to the case where this bound on the number of distinct vectors gi is not loose: there is a corresponding
lower bound on n, i.e., n = Ω(2T ). Therefore, the case of large values of n corresponds to n = Θ(2T ).
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Figure 6. Bandwidth (Tk on the y-axis) versus privacy (k on the x-axis) trade-off when using the k-limited-access schemes in
Theorem IV.1 for different values of n. The plots in this figure are for T = 20.
our schemes perform similarly well when n is sufficiently large (and not necessarily equal to
2T − 1) as shown in Figure 6(b) where n = T 4. Finally, Figure 6(c) shows the performance for
a small value of n (n = T 2). The figure shows that our proposed constructions do not perform
as well when n and k are small, a case which we study in more details in Section V.
We now conclude this section by giving explicit constructions of the P matrix and prove the
two upper bounds on Tk in (7) and (8). Our design of P allows to reconstruct any of the 2T
vectors of size T . As such our constructions are universal, in the sense that the matrix P that
we construct does not depend on the specific index coding matrix A.
A. Proof of Theorem IV.1, Equations (7) and (8)
Recall that A is full rank and that the i-th row of G can be expressed as gi = diA, where di ∈
FT2 is the coefficients row vector associated with gi. We next analyze two different cases/regimes,
which depend on the value of k.
Case I: dT/2e ≤ k < T . When n ≥ T + 1, let
P =
IT
1T
 , (9)
which results in a matrix Ak with Tk = T + 1, matching the bound in (7). We now show that
each gi = diA, i ∈ [n], can be reconstructed by combining up to k vectors of Ak. Let w(di)
be the Hamming weight of di. If w(di) ≤ dT/2e, then we can reconstruct gi as gi = [di 0]Ak,
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which involves adding w(di) ≤ dT/2e ≤ k rows of Ak. Differently, if w(di) ≥ dT/2e+ 1, then
we can reconstruct gi as gi = [d¯i 1]Ak, where d¯i is the bitwise complement of di. In this case,
reconstructing gi involves adding T − w(di) + 1 ≤ bT/2c ≤ k rows of Ak.
When n < T + 1, then it is sufficient to send n uncoded transmissions, where the i-th
transmission satisfies ci, i ∈ [n]. In this case ci has access only to the i-th transmission, i.e.,
k = 1. This completes the proof of the upper bound in (7).
Example: We show how the scheme works via a small example, where T = 4 and k = 2. In
this case, we have
P =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1

.
If gi =
[
1 1 0 0
]
A, then it can be reconstructed as gi =
[
1 1 0 0 0
]
PA with 2 rows of
PA used in the reconstruction. Differently, if gi =
[
1 1 1 0
]
A, then it can be reconstructed
as gi =
[
0 0 0 1 1
]
PA with again 2 rows of PA used in the reconstruction.
Case II: 1 ≤ k < dT/2e. Let Q = ⌊T/ ⌈T
k
⌉⌋
and Trem = T −Q
⌈
T
k
⌉
. If k divides T , then Q = k,
Trem = 0, otherwise Q ≤ k − 1 and Trem ≤
⌈
T
k
⌉
. Then, we can write
P =

Z1 0 · · · 0 0
0 Z2 · · · 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 · · · ZQ 0
0 0 · · · 0 ZQ+1

,
where, for i ∈ [Q], the matrix Zi, of dimension λi × T , is constructed as follows
Zi =
[
0λi×(i−1)dTk e Z¯i 0λi×(Q−i)dTk e 0λi×Trem
]
,
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where Z¯i, of dimension λi ×
⌈
T
k
⌉
, has as rows all non-zero vectors of length
⌈
T
k
⌉
. Therefore,
λi = 2
dT/ke − 1. Similarly, the matrix ZQ+1, of dimension λQ+1 × T , is constructed as follows
ZQ+1 =
[
0λQ+1×QdTk e Z¯Q+1
]
,
where Z¯Q+1, of dimension λQ+1×Trem, has as rows all non-zero vectors of length Trem. Therefore,
λQ+1 = 2
Trem − 1.
In other words, the matrix P is constructed as a block-diagonal matrix, with the diagonal
elements being Z¯i for all i ∈ [Q+ 1]. Therefore, equation (8) holds by computing
Tk =
Q+1∑
i=1
λi = Q
(
2dTk e − 1
)
+ 2Trem − 1 ≤ k2dTk e.
What remains is to show that any vector gi, i ∈ [n], can be reconstructed by adding at most k
vectors of P. To show this, we prove that any vector v ∈ FT2 can indeed be constructed with the
proposed design of P. We note that we can express the vector v as v = [v1 · · · vQ+1], where
vi, i ∈ [Q] are parts of the vector v each of length
⌈
T
k
⌉
, while vQ+1 is the last part of v of
length Trem. Then, we can write v =
∑
i∈K(v)
v¯i, where v¯i =
[
0(i−1)dTk e vi 0(Q−i)dTk e 0Trem
]
for
i ∈ [Q], v¯Q+1 =
[
0QdTk e vQ+1
]
and K(v) ⊆ [Q+ 1] is the set of indices for which vi is not
all-zero. According to the construction of P, for all i ∈ K(v), the corresponding vector vi is
one of the rows in Zi. The proof concludes by noting that |K(v)| ≤ k. This is true because, if
k does not divide T , then Q ≤ k− 1; otherwise, Q = k but Trem = 0 (i.e., vQ+1 does not exist),
therefore K(v) ⊆ [k]. This completes the proof of the upper bound in (8).
Example: We show how the scheme works via a small example, where T = 8 and k = 3.
For this particular example, we have Q =
⌊
T/
⌈
T
k
⌉⌋
= 2 and Trem = T −Q
⌈
T
k
⌉
= 2. Thus, the
idea is that, to reconstruct a vector v ∈ F82, we treat v as k = 3 disjoint parts; the first 2 are
of length
⌈
T
k
⌉
= 3 and the remaining part is of length Trem = 2. We then construct P as k = 3
disjoint sections, where each section allows us to reconstruct one part of the vector. Specifically,
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Figure 7. Performance of the scheme in Theorem IV.1 (referred to as Scheme-1) for different values of n, compared against
the lower bound LB in equation (6) and the upper bound UB of sending uncoded transmissions - T = 20.
we construct
Z¯1 = Z¯2 =

0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1

, Z¯3 =

0 1
1 0
1 1
 , P =

Z¯1 07×3 07×2
07×3 Z¯2 07×2
03×3 03×3 Z¯3
 .
Any vector v can be reconstructed by picking at most k vectors out of P, one from each section.
For example, let v = [0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]. This vector can be reconstructed by adding vectors number
2, 10 and 16 from P.
V. CONSTRUCTIONS FOR SMALL VALUES OF n AND k
In Section IV, we have proved that, independently of the value of n, if k ≥ dT/2e, then it
is sufficient to add one additional transmission to the T transmissions of the conventional index
coding scheme. Moreover, the analysis provided in Lemma IV.2 showed the order-optimality of
our universal scheme in Theorem IV.1 (referred to as Scheme-1) for values of k < dT/2e when n
is large (i.e., exponential in T ). Figure 7 shows the performance of Scheme-1 in Theorem IV.1 as
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a function of the values of n for T = 20, with k = 2 in Figure 7(a) and k = 5 in Figure 7(b). The
performance of Scheme-1 was obtained by averaging over 1000 random index coding instances.
In each instance, a code is constructed using the scheme described in Section IV-A, and only
the rows actually used by the clients c[n] are retained. The performance of the scheme is finally
computed by the average number of rows retained in those 1000 iterations. Figure 7 shows that
our proposed scheme performs well not only for the case of large n (i.e., n = 2T−1) but also for
lower values of n. However, Figure 7 also suggests that for small values of both n and k (note
the left-half of the plot in Figure 7(a)), we need to devise schemes that better adapt to the specific
values of the index coding matrix A and vectors gi, i ∈ [n] (recall that Scheme-1 is universal,
and hence independent of the value of A). We next propose and analyze the performance of
such algorithms.
A. Special Instances
We first represent the problem through a bipartite graph as follows. We assume that the rank
of the matrix G is T . Then, there exists a set of T linearly independent vectors in G; without
loss of generality, we denote them as g1 to gT . Therefore, each vector gi+T , i ∈ [n−T ], can be
expressed as a linear combination of some/all vectors from g[T ]; we denote these vectors as the
component vectors of gi+T . We can then represent the problem as a bipartite graph (U ∪ V , E)
with |U| = T and |V| = n − T , where ui ∈ U represents the vector gi for i ∈ [T ], vj ∈ V
represents the vector gj+T for j ∈ [n− T ], and an edge exists from node ui to node vj if gi is
one of the component vectors of gj+T . Figure 8 shows an example of such graph, where n = 9
and T = 6. For instance, v1 (i.e., g7) can be reconstructed by adding ui, i ∈ [4] (i.e., gi, i ∈ [4]).
Given a node s in the graph, we refer to the sets Os and Is as the outbound and inbound sets
of s, respectively: the inbound set contains the nodes which have edges outgoing to node s,
and the outbound set contains the nodes to which node s has outgoing edges (i.e., the nodes
each of which has an incoming edge from s). Nodes on either sides of the bipartite graph have
either inbound or outbound sets. For instance, with reference to Figure 8, Ou1 = {v1, v2, v3} and
Iv1 = {u1, u2, u3, u4}. For this particular example, there exists a scheme with T2 = 6 which can
reconstruct any vector with at most k = 2 additions. The matrix A2 which corresponds to this
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Figure 8. Bipartite graph representation. Figure 9. Optimal representation when k = 2.
solution consists of the following vectors: g1, g1 + g2, g1 + g2 + g3, g1 + g2 + g3 + g4, g5 and
g5 + g6. It is not hard to see that each vector in G can be reconstructed by adding at most 2
vectors in A2. The vectors in A2 that are not in G can be aptly represented as intermediate nodes
on the previously described bipartite graph. These intermediate nodes are shown in Figure 9 as
highlighted nodes. Each added node represents a new vector, which is the sum of the vectors
associated to the nodes in its inbound set. We refer to the process of adding these intermediate
nodes as creating a branch, which is defined next.
Definition V.1. Given an ordered set S = {s1, · · · , sS} of nodes, where si precedes si+1 for
i ∈ [S − 1], a branch on S is a set S ′ = {s′1, · · · , s′S−1} of S − 1 intermediate nodes added to
the graph with the following connections: node s′1 has two incoming edges from s1 and s2, and
for i ∈ [S − 1] \ {1}, s′i has two incoming edges from nodes s′i−1 and si+1.
For the example in Figure 9, we created branches on two ordered sets, S1 = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
and S2 = {u5, u6}. Once the branch is added, we can change the connections of the nodes in
V in accordance to the added vectors. For the example in Figure 9, we can replace u[4] in Iv1
with only s3. Using this representation, we have the following lemma.
Lemma V.1. If OuiT ⊆ OuiT−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Oui1 for some permutation i1, · · · , iT of [T ], then this
instance can be solved by exactly T transmissions for any k ≥ 2.
Proof: One solution of such instance would involve creating a branch on the set S =
{ui1 , ui2 , · · · , uiT }. The scheme used would have the matrix A2 with its t-th row at =
t∑`
=1
gi` for
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t ∈ [T ]. Note that gi1 = a1 and at + at−1 = git for all t ∈ [T ] \ {1}. Moreover, for j ∈ [n] \ [T ],
if vj−T ∈ Ouit for some it, then vj−T ∈ Oui` for all ` ≤ t. If we let t be the maximum index
for which vj−T ∈ Ouit , then we have Ivj−T = {ui1 , · · · , uit}, and so we get gj =
t∑`
=1
gi` = at.
This completes the proof. 
Corollary V.2. For G ∈ Fn×T2 of rank T , if n = T + 1, then this instance can be solved in T
transmissions for any k ≥ 2.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let g[T ] be a set of linearly independent vectors of G. Then,
we have Oui = {v1} for i ∈ Iv1 and Ouj = ∅ for j ∈ [T ] \ Iv1 . Thus, from Lemma V.1, this
instance can be solved in T transmissions. This completes the proof. 
B. Algorithms for General Instances
We here propose two different algorithms, namely Successive Circuit Removing (SCR) and
Branch-Search, and analyze their performance.
Algorithm 1: Successive Circuit Removing (SCR). Our first proposed algorithm is based on
Corollary V.2, which can be interpreted as follows: any matrix G of r+ 1 row vectors and rank
r can be reconstructed by a corresponding A2 matrix with r rows. If there does not exist any
subset of rows of G with rank less than r, we call G a circuit4. Our algorithm works for the
case k = 2q, for some integer q. We first describe SCR for the case where q = 1, and then
extend it to general values of q. The algorithm works as follows:
1) Circuit Finding: find a set of vectors of G that form a circuit of small size. Denote the size
of this circuit as r + 1.
2) Matrix Update: apply Corollary V.2 to find a set of r vectors that can optimally reconstruct
the circuit by adding at most k = 2 of them, and add this set to A2.
3) Circuit Removing: update G by removing the circuit. Repeat the first two steps until the
matrix G is of size T ′ × T and of rank T ′, where T ′ ≤ T . Then, add these vectors to A2.
Once SCR is executed, the output is a matrix A2 such that any vector in G can be reconstructed
by adding at most k = 2 vectors of A2. Consider now the case where q = 2 (i.e., k = 4) for
4This is in accordance to the definition of a circuit for a matroid [11].
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example. In this case, a second application of SCR on the matrix A2 would yield another matrix,
denoted as A4, such that any row in A2 can be reconstructed by adding at most 2 vectors of
A4. Therefore, any vector in G can now be reconstructed by adding at most 4 vectors of A4.
We can therefore extrapolate this idea for a general q by successively applying SCR q times on
G to obtain Ak, with k = 2q.
The following theorem gives a closed form characterization of the best and worst case
performance of SCR.
Theorem V.3. Let T SCRq be the number of vectors in Ak obtained via SCR. Then, for k = 2q
and integer q, we have
fBest(fBest(· · · fBest(n)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q times
≤T SCRq ≤fWorst(fWorst(· · · fWorst(n)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q times
, (10)
where fBest(n) = 2
⌊
n
3
⌋
and fWorst(n) = T
(⌊
n
T+1
⌋
+ 1
)
.
Proof: First we focus on the case q = 1. The lower bound in (10) corresponds to the best case
when the matrix G can be partitioned into disjoint circuits of size 3. In this case, if SCR finds
one such circuit in each iteration, then each circuit is replaced with 2 vectors in A2 according
to Corollary V.2. To obtain the upper bound, note that any collection of T + 1 has at most T
independent vectors, and therefore contains a circuit of at most size T + 1. Therefore, the upper
bound corresponds to the case where the matrix G can be partitioned into circuits of size T + 1
and an extra T linearly independent vectors. In that case, the algorithm can go through each of
these circuits, adding T vectors to A2 for each of these circuits, and then add the last T vectors
in the last step of the algorithm. Finally, the bounds in (10) for a general q can be proven by a
successive repetition of the above arguments. 
Algorithm 2: Branch-Search. A naive approach to determining the optimal matrix Ak is to
consider the whole space FT2 , loop over all possible subsets of vectors of FT2 and, for every subset,
check if it can be used as a matrix Ak. The minimum-size subset which can be used as Ak is
indeed the optimal matrix. However, such algorithm requires in the worst case O
(
22
T
)
number
of operations, which makes it prohibitively slow even for very small values of T . Instead, the
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heuristic that we here propose finds a matrix Ak more efficiently than the naive search scheme.
The main idea behind the heuristic is based on providing a subset R ⊂ FT2 which is much
smaller than 2T and is guaranteed to have at least one solution. The heuristic then searches for
a matrix Ak by looping over all possible subsets of R. Our heuristic therefore consists of two
sub-algorithms, namely Branch and Search. Branch takes as input G, and produces as output a
set of vectors R which contains at least one solution Ak. The algorithm works as follows:
1) Find a set of T vectors of G that are linearly independent. Denote this set as B.
2) Create a bipartite graph representation of G as discussed in Section V-A, using B as the
independent vectors for U .
3) Pick the dependent node vi with the highest degree, and split ties arbitrarily. Denote by deg(vi)
the degree of node vi.
4) Consider the inbound set Ivi , and sort its elements in a descending order according to their
degrees. Without loss of generality, assume that this set of ordered independent nodes is Ivi =
{u1, u2, · · · , udeg(vi)}.
5) Create a branch on Ivi . Denote the new branch nodes as {u?1, u?2, · · · , u?deg(vi)}.
6) Update the connections of all dependent nodes in accordance with the constructed branch.
This is done as follows: for each node vj ∈ V with deg(vj) ≥ k, if Ivj ∩ Ivi is of the form
{u1, u2, · · · , u`} for some ` ≤ deg(vi), then replace {u1, u2, · · · , u`} in Ivj with the single
node u?` . Do such replacement for the maximum possible value of `.
7) Repeat 3) to 6) until all nodes in V have degree at most k.
The output R is the set of vectors corresponding to all nodes in the graph. The next theorem
shows that R in fact contains one possible Ak, and characterizes the performance of Branch.
Theorem V.4. For a matrix G of dimension n×T , (a) Branch produces a set R which contains
at least one possible Ak, (b) the worst-case time complexity tBranch of Branch is O(n2), and (c)
|R| ≤ (n− T )T .
Proof: To see (a), note that the algorithm terminates when all dependent nodes have a degree
of k or less. In every iteration of the algorithm, the degrees of all dependent nodes either remain
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the same or are reduced. In addition, at least one dependent node is updated and its degree is
reduced to 1. Therefore the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate. Since all dependent nodes have
degrees k or less, their corresponding vectors can be reconstructed by at most k vectors in R.
Therefore, R contains at least one solution Ak.
To prove (b), the worst-case runtime of Branch corresponds to going over all nodes in V ,
creating a branch for each one. For the i-th node considered by Branch, the algorithm would
update the dependencies of all dependent nodes with degrees greater than k, which are at most
n− i nodes. Therefore tBranch =
n−1∑
i=0
(n− i) = n(n− 1) = O(n2).
To prove (c), note that |R| is equal to the total number of nodes in all branches created by
the algorithm. Therefore we can write |R| ≤ ∑
vi∈V
deg(vi) ≤ (n− T )T = O(nT ). 
Let tSearch be the worst-time complexity of the Search step in Branch-Search. Then the worst-
case time complexity of Branch-Search is equal to tBS = tBranch + tSearch ≤ O(n2) + 2|R| =
O(n2)+O(2nT ) = O(2nT ), which is exponentially better than the complexity of the naive search.
Although our heuristic is still of exponential runtime complexity, we observe from numerical
simulations that |R| is usually much less than (n−T )T . Finding more efficient ways of searching
through the set R to find a solution Ak is an open question.
C. Numerical Evaluation
We here explore the performance of our proposed schemes through numerical evaluations.
Specifically, we assess the performance in terms of Tk of SCR and Branch-Search (labeled as
BS). We compare their performance against the lower bound in equation (6) (labeled as LB),
and the upper bound of sending uncoded transmissions (labeled as UB). In particular, we are
interested in regimes for which k < dT/2e, because otherwise we know from Theorem IV.1 that
Tk = T + 1. Moreover, we consider values of n < 2T − 1, because if n = 2T − 1 we know
from Lemma IV.2 that Scheme-1 is order optimal. For SCR, we evaluate its average performance
(averaged over 1000 iterations) as well as its upper and lower bounds performance established
in Theorem V.3. For Branch-Search, we evaluate its average performance (averaged over 1000
iterations). Figure 10 shows the performance of all the aforementioned schemes for T = 6
and k = 2. As can be seen from Figure 10, SCR consistently performs better than uncoded
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Figure 10. Performance comparison for different schemes - T = 6, k = 2.
transmissions. In addition, although the current implementation of SCR greedily searches for a
small circuit to remove, more sophisticated algorithms for small circuit finding could potentially
improve its performance. However, the bounds in (10) suggest that the performance of SCR is
asymptotically O(n). Branch-Search appears to perform better than other schemes in the average
sense. Understanding its asymptotic behavior in the worst-case is an interesting open problem.
VI. RELATED WORK
Index coding was introduced in [5], where the problem was proven to be NP-hard. Given this,
several works have aimed at providing approximate algorithms for the index coding problem [6],
[8], [12]. In our work, we were interested in studying the index coding problem from the
perspective of private information delivery.
The problem of protecting privacy was initially proposed to enable the disclosure of databases
for public access, while maintaining the anonymity of the clients [13]. Similar concerns have
been raised in the context of Private Information Retrieval (PIR), which was introduced in [14]
and has received a fair amount of attention [15]–[19]. In particular, in PIR the goal is to ensure
that no information about the identity of clients’ requests is revealed to a set of malicious
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databases when clients are trying to retrieve information from them. Similarly, the problem of
Oblivious Transfer was studied [20], [21] to establish, by means of cryptographic techniques,
two-way private connections between the clients and the server. We note that it is not clear how
the use of cryptographic approaches would help in our setup. A curious client, in fact, obtains
information about other clients once she learns the transmitted combinations of the messages,
i.e., the coding operations. In other words, given that a curious client has also requested data,
she needs to learn how the transmitted messages are coded, in order to be able to decode her
own requested message.
We were here interested in addressing privacy concerns in broadcast domains. In particular,
we analyzed this problem within the index coding framework, as we recently proposed in [9].
This problem differs from secure index coding [22], [23], where the goal is to guarantee that an
external eavesdropper (with her own side information set) in [22], and each client in [23], does
not learn any information about the content of the messages other than her requested message.
Differently, our goal was to limit the information that a client can learn about the identities
of the requests of other clients (however, the two approaches could be combined). 1Note that
the techniques developed here can fundamentally differ from those designed for secure index
coding. As an extreme example, in fact, the server in our setup can trivially send all the messages
that it possesses in an uncoded manner on the broadcast channel. In this case, a curious client
will be able to decode all messages, but would still not be able to infer which messages were
requested/possessed by other clients, and would learn nothing about their side information. This
property is what fundamentally contrasts the problem under consideration from the works in [22],
[23]. Moreover, our approach here has a significant difference with respect to [9]. In fact, while
in [9] our goal was to design the coding matrix to guarantee a high-level of privacy, here we
assumed that an index coding matrix (that satisfies all clients) was given to us and we developed
methods to increase its achieved level of privacy.
The use of k-limited-access schemes allows the server to transform an existing index code
into a locally decodable index code [24], [25]. Locally decodable index codes allow each client
to decode her request using at most k symbols out of the codeword, where k is referred to as the
locality of the code. In [24], the authors showed that the optimal scalar linear locally decodable
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index codes with locality 1 are the ones obtained from the coloring of the information graph of
the index coding problem. In addition, they provided probabilistic results on the existence (and
the impossibility of existence) of locally decodable codes with particular lengths and localities
for index coding problems on random graphs. In [25], the authors extended one result in [24]
where they showed that the optimal vector linear locally decodable index codes with locality 1
are obtained from the fractional coloring of the information graph. In addition, they provided a
scheme which allows the construction of locally decodable codes for a particular set of index
coding instances with special properties, i.e., when certain covering properties are maintained
on the side information graph of the index coding problem. Differently from these works, one
of the main results of this paper consisted of providing deterministic constructions/schemes
which transform any existing index code into an equivalent code with locality k. In addition,
our schemes are universal, i.e., they do not depend on the underlying index coding instance.
The solution that we here proposed to limit the privacy leakage is based on finding overcom-
plete bases. This approach is closely related to compressed sensing and dictionary learning [26],
where the goal is to learn a dictionary of signals such that other signals can be sparsely and
accurately represented using atoms from this dictionary. These problems seek lossy solutions, i.e.,
signal reconstruction is not necessarily perfect. This allows a convex optimization formulation
of the problem, which can be solved efficiently [27]. In contrast, our problem was concerned
with lossless reconstructions, in which case the optimization problem is no longer convex.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied privacy risks in index coding. This problem is motivated by the
observation that, since the coding matrix needs to be available to all clients, then some clients
may be able to infer the identity of the request and side information of other clients. We proposed
the use of k-limited-access schemes: these schemes transform the coding matrix so that we can
restrict each client to access at most k-rows of the transformed matrix as opposed to the whole
of it. We explored two privacy metrics, one based on entropy arguments, and the other on the
maximal information leakage. Both metrics indicate that the amount of privacy increases with
the number of rows that we hide. We then designed polynomial time universal k-limited-access
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schemes, that do not depend on the structure of the index coding matrix A and proved that
they are order-optimal when either k or n is large. For the case where both k and n are small,
we proposed algorithms that depend on the structure of the index coding matrix A and provide
improved performance. We overall found that there exists an inherent trade-off between privacy
and bandwidth (number of broadcast transmissions), and that in some cases we can achieve
significant privacy with minimal overhead.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA III.1
The proof is based on simple counting arguments. A subspace L contains all vectors in Ln,
the number of which is 2k. A subspace L therefore consists of a set of T−k linearly independent
vectors {v1, · · · vT−k} that are in Fm2 \Ln, and all linear combinations of {v[T−k]} and vectors in
Ln. We now enumerate the number of ways such a subspace L, with Ln ⊆ L, can be constructed.
We first pick a vector v1 ∈ Fm2 \ Ln. The total number of possible choices for v1 is equal to
2m − 2k. Once v1 is selected to be in L, then all vectors in v1 + Ln are added to L, where
v1 + Ln is the set of vectors obtained by adding v1 to all possible vectors in Ln. Therefore, by
picking v1, the total number of vectors of Fm2 that do not belong to L is now equal to 2m−2k+1,
out of which we pick v2. The above process is repeated until all vectors {v[T−k]} are selected.
Therefore, the total number of such choices becomes
∏T−k−1
`=0
(
2m − 2k+`). In order to compute
the total number of subspaces, we need to divide this number by the total number of basis
vectors (i.e., linearly independent vectors) used to represent the vectors in L \ Ln; we denote
them by {b1, · · · , bT−k}. The number of vectors in such a basis is T − k. Given a subspace L,
we pick b1 from the set of vectors in L \Ln, the number of which is 2T − 2k. Then we pick b2
from the set of vectors L \ (Ln + b1), the number of which is 2T − 2k+1. We repeat the previous
argument for all T − k vectors. The total number of such basis vectors is therefore equal to∏T−k−1
`=0
(
2T − 2k+`). Dividing the two quantities therefore proves Lemma III.1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM III.3
To prove Theorem III.3, we first recall the definition of G(qi,Si). Given qi and Si, G(qi,Si) is
the set which contains all possible i-th vectors gi of the realization G of the matrix G, namely
G(qi,Si) =
{
g ∈ Fm2 | gqi = 1, g[m]\{qi∪Si} = 0
}
.
In addition, we define the following set. Given gi and an integer r, we let D(gi, r) be the set
of all possible matrices A(i)k of r rows from which gi can be reconstructed, namely
D(gi, r) =
{
Z ∈ Fr×m2 | ∃d ∈ Fr2 s.t. gi = dZ
}
.
Note that the definition of D(gi, r) is different than that of P(gi,Ak, r) in that it is not dependent
on a specific matrix Ak. Then, we can write
P
(MIL)
k = L(A→ A(n)k |Qn = qn, Sn = Sn)
(a)
≤ log
∣∣∣A(n)k |Qn = qn, Sn = Sn∣∣∣
(b)
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k⋃
r=1
⋃
gn∈G(qn,Sn)
D(gn, r)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ log
 k∑
r=1
∑
gn∈G(qn,Sn)
|D(gn, r)|

(c)
= log
(
2|Sn|
k∑
r=1
|D(g′n, r)|
)
(d)
≤ log
(
2|Sn|
k∑
r=1
r−2∏
j=0
(2m − 2j+1)
)
≤ log (2|Sn|k(2m − 2)k−1)
= O(|Sn|+mk),
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from Property 2 of the MIL; (ii) the equality in (b) follows
by noting that, given Qn and Sn, a possible A
(n)
k would belong to D(gn, r) for some r ∈ [k] and
some gn ∈ G(Qn, Sn); (iii) the equality in (c) follows by noting that, by symmetry, the number of
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matrices with r rows from which the vector gi can be reconstructed is the same for every possible
vector gi ∈ G(qi,Si). Therefore, the sum over gn can be replaced by D(g′n, r)×|G(qn,Sn)| where
g′n is any arbitrary vector in G(qn,Sn). Based on the structure of the vectors gn ∈ G(qn,Sn), i.e.,
one in position qn and zeros in the positions [m] \ {qn ∪ Sn}, it follows that |G(qn,Sn)| = 2|Sn|;
(iv) the inequality in (d) is obtained by counting arguments similar to those in the proof of
Lemma III.1. In particular, we enumerate the number of ways we can construct a matrix A(n)k
with r linearly independent rows, which when linearly combined gives gi. We first pick a row
vector v1 ∈ Fm2 \ Span(gi), where Span(X ) of a set of row vectors X is the row span of
these vectors; the number of possible vectors v1 is 2m − 2. Then, we pick a second row vector
v2 ∈ Fm2 \Span({gi, v1}); the number of possible vectors v2 is 2m−22. We repeat this argument
for r− 1 vectors; the r-th vector is then selected so that a linear combination of all r vectors is
equal to gi.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM III.4
We have
P¯
(MIL)
k = L(A→ A|Qn = qn, Sn = Sn)
(a)
= log |{A : p(A|Qn = qn, Sn = Sn) > 0}|
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
g∈G(qn,Sn)
{A : ∃d ∈ FT2 ,g = dA}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ log ∣∣{A : ∃d ∈ FT2 ,g′ = dA}∣∣
(b)
≥ log |{L ⊆ Fm2 : dim(L) = T,g′ ∈ L}|
(c)
= log
T−1∏
j=1
(
2m − 2j
2T − 2j
)
(d)
≥ log
(
2m − 2
2T − 2
)T−1
= Ω
(
mT − T 2) ,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows from Property 3 of the MIL; (ii) the inequality in (b)
follows by letting L ⊆ Fm2 be a subspace of dimension dim(L); (iii) the equality in (c) follows
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by using Lemma III.1 with k = 1 (since g′ has only one row) and t = T ; (iv) the inequality in
(d) follows by noting that
(
2m − 2j
2T − 2j
)
≥
(
2m − 2
2T − 2
)
for j ∈ [T − 1].
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM IV.1 - EQUATION (6) AND LEMMA IV.2
Theorem IV.1 - Equation (6). Given an index coding matrix A, we denote by VA ⊆ FT2 the
subspace formed by the span of the rows of A. It is clear that the dimension of VA is at most T
(exactly T if A is full rank) and that the n distinct rows of G lie in VA. Let ai ∈ Fm2 , i ∈ [Tk],
be the i-th row of Ak. Then, the problem of finding a lower bound on the value of Tk can be
formulated as follows: what is a minimum-size set of vectors Ak = {a[Tk]} such that any row
vector of G can be represented by a linear combination of at most k vectors of Ak?
A lower bound on Tk can be obtained as follows. Given Ak, there must exist a linear
combination of at most k vectors of Ak that is equal to each of the n distinct row vectors
of G. The number of distinct non-zero linear combinations of up to k vectors is at most equal
to
k∑
j=1
(
Tk
j
)
. Thus, we have
k∑
i=1
(
Tk
i
)
≥ n. (11)
Combining this with the fact that Tk ≥ T gives precisely the bound in (6).
Lemma IV.2. We now derive the lower bound in Lemma IV.2. We first consider the case where
n = 2T − 1. From (11), we obtain
k∑
i=1
(
Tk
i
)
≥ 2T − 1. (12)
Since in general Tk ≥ T , to prove that Tk ≥ T + 1 for k < T , it is sufficient to show that we
have a contradiction for Tk = T . Indeed, by setting Tk = T , the bound in (12) becomes
k∑
i=1
(
T
i
)
≥ 2T − 1 =
T∑
i=1
(
T
i
)
,
which clearly is not possible since k < T . Hence, Tk ≥ T + 1 for all k < T .
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For a general n and 1 ≤ k < dT/2e, we have
k
(
Tke
k
)k
≥ k
(
Tk
k
)
≥
k∑
i=1
(
Tk
i
)
≥ n
=⇒ Tk ≥ k
k−1
k
e
n1/k = Ω(kn
1
k ).
Therefore, Tk = Ω(k2
T
k ) when n = Θ(2T ). This lower bound, along with the upper bound in
equation (8) concludes the proof of Lemma IV.2.
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